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ABSTRACT 
It is generally acknowledged that the implementation of more efficient road pricing measures meet public 
resistance and that acceptability is nowadays one of the major barriers to successful implementation. This paper 
presents the empirical results of a questionnaire among Dutch commuters regularly facing congestion asking for 
their opinion (in terms of acceptance) on road pricing measures and revenue use targets. We find that road 
pricing is in general not very acceptable and that revenue use is important for the explanation of the level of 
acceptance. Road pricing is more acceptable when revenues are used to replace existing car taxation or to lower 
fuel taxes. Moreover, personal characteristics of the respondent have an impact on support levels. Higher 
educated people, as well as respondents with a higher value of time and with higher perceived effectiveness of 
the measure, seem to find road pricing measures more acceptable than other people. The same holds for people 
that receive financial support for their commuting costs and for respondents driving many kilometers in a year. 
When we ask directly for the acceptability of different types of revenue use (not part of a road pricing measure), 
again abandoning of existing car (ownership) taxes receives most support whereas the general budget is not 
acceptable. It appears that lower income groups have a stronger preference for a reduction of existing income  
taxes when revenues from road pricing are allocated than higher income people. 
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1.  Introduction 
Road transport is known to generate considerable external costs, in particular in the form of 
congestion, accidents and noise. Governments may use different types of measures to deal 
with  these  problems,  pricing  being  one  of  them.  Most countries  use a  number  of coarse 
pricing mechanisms, such as fuel duties, registration fees and parking charges. This current 
charging regime however, is not very efficient. Economists have advocated the use of more 
targeted pricing tools for a long time, and have demonstrated the welfare gains. Nevertheless, 
these more efficient road pricing measures have up till now only seldom been implemented in 
practice. The low level of implementation is nowadays not so much caused by technical or 
administrative  problems.  It  is  generally  acknowledged  that  pricing  measures  meet  public 
resistance and that acceptability is one of the major barriers to successful implementation of 
new and more efficient pricing measures (MC-ICAM, 2003).  
Transport pricing schemes have the double consequence of discouraging transport use, at least 
at certain times on certain parts of the network, and of transferring cash from private persons 
to other (often public) funds. The fact that road pricing – at least before recycling of revenues 
– involves such a transfer of cash from private travelers to public institutions, is likely to be a 
major impediment to its public acceptability. Furthermore, the implementation of efficient 
road pricing policies typically affects equity in a way that policy makers and/or the general 
population are likely to disapprove of.  
Therefore, to render pricing schemes politically and publicly acceptable, it seems desirable to 
‘recycle’ the revenues generated in such a way that most population subgroups are at least 
equally well off. The destination and distribution of these revenues may be used to gain public 
and political acceptance. At the same time, acceptability objectives of revenue recycling may 
conflict  with efficiency  goals.  Mayeres and Proost (2001) suggest  for instance that  using 
revenues for public transport investments may induce welfare losses that exceed the welfare 
benefits obtained from pricing itself.  
The Netherlands has a long experience in developing new road pricing proposals to reduce the 
increasing levels of congestion. None of these plans has ever been implemented mainly due to 
low  levels  of  public  acceptance.  It  is  therefore  interesting  to  investigate  the  issue  of 
acceptance of road pricing and use of revenues in this country. This paper reports on the 
acceptability of new road pricing measures among Dutch commuters facing congestion on a 
regular basis.   
This  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  2  discusses  the  previous  literature  on  the 
acceptance of road pricing and the role of revenue use in this. Many public concerns can be 
identified which policy makers should take into account when thinking about implementation 
of road pricing. Acceptance is significantly affected by the way in which revenues are used; 
various possibilities exist, all with different consequences. Section 3 outlines the empirical 
survey conducted, and presents the results from our data analysis. We try to identify important 
explanatory variables for the level of acceptance for different types of road pricing measures, 
and identify the most acceptable destination of the revenues. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  Acceptability and Revenue Use in Literature 
In modern societies private cars play a very important role in satisfying existing mobility 
demands. But current car traffic also causes serious problems like congestion, pollution, noise 
and  accidents.  Theory  of  transport  economics  detects  the  problem  as  one  of  negative 
externalities: since marginal social costs exceed the marginal private costs, demand is too 
high.  The  standard  theoretical  economic  solution  is  to  internalise  these  external  costs  by 
raising the price to marginal social costs. It is remarkable that such pricing instruments are  
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applied so seldom, because efficiency improvements mean that everyone can potentially be 
made better off, because the winners are more than able to compensate the losers. Various 
explanations  can  be  given  why  the  measure  is  only  rarely  implemented  in  practice.  The 
regulator may face different types of constraints ranging from practical (and technical) ones to 
institutional  and  acceptability  constraints  (see  for  an  overview  on  barriers  Ubbels  and 
Verhoef, 2004). At present the major barriers to the successful implementation of transport 
pricing strategies relate largely to lack of stakeholder and political acceptability, rather than to 
technical  or  administrative  problems.  Since  raising  prices  is  generally  disliked  by  the 
respective  user  group,  the  acceptance  of  pricing  policies  is  often  low.  But  pricing  also 
generates revenues, which one can use for many purposes, including influencing the public 
acceptability  of  pricing.  In  this  section  we  discuss  literature  results  on  revenue  use  and 
acceptance of road pricing.  
 
2.1  Acceptability and the Implementation of Transport Pricing Measures 
Many attempts have been undertaken to introduce urban road pricing around the world over 
the last 40 years, and many of them have failed. Examples of schemes that have never been 
implemented include Stockholm, Hong Kong and the Netherlands. In most cases extensive 
studies had demonstrated the technical feasibility and economic benefits of introducing the 
scheme, but the problem was public and political acceptability. This aspect has apparently 
received inadequate attention in the belief that a scheme which showed strong social and 
economic benefits would sell itself. 
Despite the fact that politicians and the public regard traffic problems in cities as a very 
important and urgent issue, people may have several concerns about road pricing. Besides the 
views and intentions of the persons affected by the measure, also responsible political bodies, 
as another key group, have to be taken into account. The TransPrice project concluded that the 
lack of political willingness to implement charging measures stems from a perceived low 
acceptability  of  the  electorate  for  such  measures  (TransPrice,  1999).  This  paper  will  not 
consider acceptability of politicians but instead focus on the public acceptability. The policy 
maker  should  consider  this  before  implementing  pricing  measures  of  any  kind.  Public 
concerns often mentioned include (Jones, 1998): 
·  It is difficult for drivers to accept the notion that they should pay for congestion, it seems 
irrational and inappropriate; 
·  Car users feel that urban road pricing is not needed, roads are a publicly provided good 
that should be free at the point of use; 
·  Pricing will not lessen congestion, it is an ineffective measure because drivers will be 
inelastic to road charges; 
·  The measure will result in unacceptable privacy issues; 
·  Road  pricing  will  face  implementation  problems  such  as  unreliable  technology  and 
boundary issues; 
·  Road pricing is considered to be unfair. 
Despite these concerns, there are some practical experiences where road pricing actually has 
been implemented. Singapore, Norway and ‘value’ pricing projects in the U.S. are examples 
where road tolls are levied. These projects have also met public opposition, but the political 
will was strong in most cases. The proposal of the Oslo toll ring for instance, was opposed by 
70% of the population (PROSAM, 2000). Remarkable is that the proportion in favour of the 
toll  system  has  steadily  increased  over  time.  Sullivan  (2002)  has  found  that  successfully 
implemented  value  pricing  projects  (projects  with  variable  tolls)  often  share  several  key 
attributes including effective advertising, communication of benefits in simple and tangible  
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terms and the fact that use of the tolled road was optional (people had a choice). However, 
there are also some projects that failed. Characteristics of unsuccessful efforts include the 
presence of influential project adversaries and the perception of the public that the schemes 
are developed just to raise extra money. 
The  level  of  acceptance  may  also  be  explained  by  other  factors.  Verhoef  (1996)  asked 
morning peak road users about their opinion on road pricing. An overwhelming majority 
(83%) stated that his or her opinion depends on the allocation of revenues. The opinion of 
businesses on the other hand seem to depend very much on the perceived effectiveness with 
regard to time savings. An analysis of the economic effects of road pricing in Utrecht (the 
Netherlands) indicates that companies are positive as long as time savings are expected to 
compensate for road pricing costs (see PATS, 1999). However, these businesses do have their 
doubts whether road pricing would be really effective and decrease the level of congestion. 
Results  from  four  case  study  cities  in  the  EU  study  AFFORD  (2001)  show  that  factors 
determining business acceptability may depend on local circumstances.  
The  previous  suggest  that  there  are  some  guidelines  to  policy  makers  that  increase  the 
probability of a successful implementation of road pricing (in terms of obtaining some level 
of  acceptability  (see  also  CUPID,  2000)).  Pricing  strategies  should  be  perceived  as  very 
effective  solutions,  and  communication  of  objectives  and  revenue  spending  is  of  crucial 
importance. Moreover, fairness issues have to be addressed, the system must be perceived as 
fair in terms of personal benefits and costs. The use of revenues together with the charging 
structure is important in influencing the distributional impacts in the desired direction.   
 
2.2  Acceptability and the Use of Revenues 
The previous indicated that the use of the revenues from pricing instruments may strongly 
influence  its acceptability.  There  are  various  options  how  to  use  the  revenues.  Literature 
suggest  that  the  revenues  may  for  instance  be  used  for  highway  capacity  enlargement, 
highway maintenance, investment in public transport, reduction in road taxes or other taxes 
(e.g.  Small,  1992  and  Higgins,  1997).  Empirical  questionnaire  results reported  in  several 
studies confirm the finding that acceptability differs depending on the type of measure and the 
way revenues are used. Bartley (1995) for instance finds that road and congestion pricing are 
generally not regarded as acceptable. Improvement of public transport is the most acceptable 
policy  to  limit  road  use  according  to  his  findings,  more  than  by  measures  which  restrict 
driving possibilities. In another study Jones (1998) finds that road pricing is not publicly 
acceptable unless the money raised is hypothecated for local transport and environmental 
projects. 
Verhoef  (1996)  asked  for  the  public  opinion  among  Dutch  commuters  on  a  number  of 
possible  allocations  of  revenue  spending  on  a  five  point  scale,  varying  from  a  very  bad 
allocation of revenues to a very good allocation. The allocation objectives that are in the 
direct interest of the road users received most support, as may be expected. Road investments, 
together with lower fuel and vehicle taxes (‘variabilisation’) received the highest average 
score. General purposes, such as general tax reductions and the government budget in general, 
obtained least support from morning peak road users. In between were transport purposes 
other than road, notably public transport.  
The importance of the use of the funds in gaining or losing public acceptance for a pricing 
measure has also been shown by a survey in the UK (Jones, 1998). The attitudes of people to 
a  series  of  measures  that  would  reduce  urban  traffic  problems  were  asked.  When  asked 
independently (road pricing as a stand alone measure), only 30% responded in support of 
charging road users to enter highly congested urban areas (Jones, 1998). The respondents  
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were then offered a package that includes a charge on entering a zone that was then used to 
fund better public transport, traffic calming and better facilities for walking and cycling. This 
resulted in a support of 57% for the package. A similar result was found in particular for 
London. A single measure was supported by 43% of the public, whereas 63% accepted the 
scheme  when  revenues  were  used  for  purposes  approved  by  respondents.  Hypothecating 
revenues thus increases public support. 
The  AFFORD  study  conducted  an  empirical  survey  on  public  acceptability  of  different 
pricing strategies in the four European cities of Athens, Como, Dresden and Oslo (see also 
Schade and Schlag, 2000). They also investigated the attitudes of the respondents regarding 
how to use the revenues arising from road pricing. It was again found that transport purposes 
of money use, such as public transport improvements, are favoured by a vast majority of 
respondents. Lowering vehicle taxes is also supported by the people, whereas lower income 
taxes  is  not  a  popular  revenue  spending  target
2.  This  study  has  also  analysed  factors 
influencing the degree of acceptability of pricing measures. Variables such as ‘social norm’, 
‘perceived  effectiveness’  and  ‘approval  of  societal  important  aims’  were  found  to  be 
positively connected with the acceptability of pricing strategies.  
An interesting study by Small (1992) suggests that public and political support can be reached 
for road pricing, even without using all revenues to compensate travelers since higher user 
charges  are  accompanied  by  reduced  travel  times.  He  searched  for  a  strategy  that  funds 
programs with such a variety of distributions of impacts that nearly everyone affected will 
find at least some offsetting benefits, and a majority will perceive the entire package as an 
improvement. Seven interest groups were distinguished ranging from traveling public and 
public  transport  users  to  low  tax  advocates.  It  was  suggested  to  keep  money  in  the 
transportation sector. Funds should be allocated about equally between monetary subsidies to 
travelers, substitutions of general taxes now used to pay for transportation services, and new 
transportation services. Small illustrates this by designing a politically feasible (in terms of 
support from the earlier identified interest groups) congestion pricing package for Southern 
California. His equity analysis indicates that this program makes every class of traveler better 
off  (combination  of  travel  time  saved,  financial  improvements  and  transportation 
improvement), with the greatest gains for higher income drivers and public transport users. 
There  is  a  downside  to  using  revenues  solely  to  improve  acceptability.  From  a  broader 
perspective, it becomes important also to consider explicitly the interaction (or trade off) 
between public acceptability and efficiency. Clearly, when too easily a scheme were adopted 
so as to meet public acceptability requirements, its efficient properties may be undermined – 
even by so much that the efficiency considerations motivating the scheme in the first place 
would then call for its cancellation. For economic efficiency reasons, revenues should be used 
in such a way that does not distort the transport sector and brings the maximum benefit to 
society. Economic theory argues that optimal congestion toll revenues are exactly sufficient to 
fund optimal road capacity (the so-called Mohring-Harwitz result). This is a straightforward 
use of toll revenues, but only applies as a strict equality under certain theoretical conditions. 
Hypothecation  of  the  revenues  to  public  transport,  often  advocated  from  an  acceptability 
perspective (“funding the substitute”), need not be very efficient. Mayeres and Proost (2001) 
demonstrate (by using a general equilibrium model) that the net welfare effect of an increase 
in  the  congestion  tax  depends  among  others  on  the  efficiency  effects of  the  tax  revenue 
recycling. A higher tax on peak car transport increases welfare when its revenue is used to cut 
                                                            
2 This is how the public prefers revenues to be used. Their expectations are rather different, however. Around 
70%  of  the respondents  expect  that  the  money  will  be  used  for  state  or  municipal  purposes,  which  is  not 
appreciated (Schade and Schlag, 2000).  
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taxes on most other commodities used in the model or to expand road capacity (the highest 
welfare gain). Using the revenues to increase the subsidy of public transport is not attractive, 
because the welfare impact of the lower congestion level is offset by the negative impact of 
stimulating the consumption of already strongly subsidized public transport. Parry and Bento 
(2001) explored the interactions between taxes on work-related traffic congestion and pre-
existing distortionary taxes in the labor market. They use a general equilibrium model to show 
that when congestion pricing revenues are used to reduce distortive labor taxes, this can raise 
the overall welfare gain from that pricing measure (it may even double this welfare benefit via 
a  net  positive  impact  on  the  labor  supply).  Lump-sum  transfers  to  households,  which 
discourage labour supply in their model, appear not to be very efficient; the welfare losses can 
easily offset the welfare gain from internalizing the congestion externality. Recycling the 
revenues in public transport fare subsidies appears to be less efficient than tax cuts of labour 
supply according to their analysis, because the former leads to a suboptimal allocation of 
commuting among modes and smaller welfare gains on the distorted labour market. This 
source of inefficiency may be even larger at more substantial amounts of traffic reductions 
(welfare losses increase due to the inability of inducing an optimal allocation). 
 
2.3  This survey 
This paper analyses the acceptance of road pricing measures (including the use of revenues) 
by Dutch commuters that face congestion. It is important to know which factors influence 
acceptability  of  road  pricing.  Literature  provides  useful  insights  on  relevant  determinants 
explaining  the  level  of  support;  these  will  briefly  be  discussed  before  we  explain  our 
objectives.  
The  previous  sections  indicated  that  public  acceptability  of  transport  pricing  measures  is 
generally low when compared with other type of transport measures such as an improvement 
of public transport (e.g. Bartley, 1995; Jones, 1998). Least accepted are generally all kinds of 
road user fees (Schade, 2003). As part of the measure, it is also important to explain what 
happens with the revenues. The allocation of revenues raised with road pricing can be an 
important  means  of  increasing  its  social  feasibility.  Furthermore,  Steg  (2003)  identifies 
several  other  factors  that  are  not  directly  linked  to  the  measure  itself  but  do  affect  the 
acceptability  of  transport  pricing.  People’s  problem  awareness,  the  attitude  towards  car 
driving, mobility related social norms and the perceived effectiveness of the measure are 
identified as important in explaining the level of support. For example, Rienstra and others 
(1999) find that the acceptance of policy measures increases if people are more convinced 
about the effectiveness of this measure.  
Acceptability  of road pricing also depends on personal features  such as age and income. 
Following economic theory, it is to be expected that high income earners may be less opposed 
to price measures in order to reduce congestion than people with lower incomes, because their 
value of time is higher. Verhoef and others (1997) indeed find that income as well as the 
willingness to pay for time gains has a significant and positive impact on the opinion on road 
pricing.  Other  factors,  such  as  the  expectation  to  be  compensated,  the  perception  of 
congestion as a problem and trip length, are also important in explaining the public’s opinion. 
Rienstra and others (1999) have analysed the support (together with perceived effectiveness 
and problem perception) for transport policy measures in general (not in particular for road 
pricing).  They  find  that  several  personal  features  and  the  perceived  effectiveness  have  a 
significant impact on the respondent’s support for policy measures in transport. While gender 
and type of household do not seem to have impact on support levels for transport measures, 
these tend to be higher when the educational level and age becomes higher. Car and driving  
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license owners support transport measures significantly less. Of all measures, car drivers have 
the least support for price measures. The authors find no significant impact of the level of 
income on the support for price measures.  
Our analysis probably comes closest to that of Rienstra (1999) and Verhoef (1997). We also 
identify factors explaining the level of acceptance of road pricing and revenue use and include 
the perceived effectiveness and the value of time of respondents into the analysis. This study 
extends  on  the  work  of  Verhoef  by  considering  multiple  variants  of  pricing  measures, 
systematically varied over dimensions such as price levels, differentiation and revenue use. 
Moreover, the individual value of time estimates are now based on a choice experiment, while 
in Verhoef’s questionnaire these were based on open-ended WTP questions. Moreover, we 
also  include  the  value  of  schedule  delay  and  uncertainty  into  the  analysis.  The  work  of 
Rienstra analysed the support for transport measures in general, we focus specifically on road 
pricing measures. For that reason, our sample consists only of car drivers facing congestion 
on a regular basis.  
 
3.  Acceptance and Revenue Use  
 
3.1  Data collection 
The data used in this paper have been obtained by conducting an (interactive) internet survey 
among Dutch commuters. The full questionnaire can roughly be divided into three parts. First, 
we asked for some socio-economic characteristics of the respondent (such as education and 
income). In order to analyse the behavioural responses to road pricing we developed a stated 
choice experiment, which is the second part of the survey. And finally we asked for the 
opinion of the respondents on several carefully explained road pricing measures. The first and 
the  second  part  was  answered  by  1115  respondents,  whereas  the  latter  sample  (opinion 
questions) consisted of 564 respondents. This paper will present outcomes of the analysis of 
this latter part of the survey.  
The data collection was executed by a specialised firm (NIPO), which has a panel of over 
50.000 respondents. Since the survey was aimed at respondents that use a car for their home 
to work journey and also face congestion on a regular basis, we selected working respondents, 
who drive to work by car two or more times per week, and who face congestion of 10 or more 
minutes  for  at  least  two  times  a  week.  This  resulted  in  a  total  of  about  6800  possible 
respondents. An initial analysis revealed that a random sample would result in a relatively low 
number of women and lower income groups. Because income differences are important to 
analyse, it was decided to ‘over sample’ the lower income groups and create an equal number 
of respondents over the various income classes. The data were collected during three weeks in 
June 2004 (before summer holidays).  
 
3.2  Survey 
As previously explained, the survey started with some general questions asking for important 
explanatory variables of the respondent. These variables may help explain the differences in 
acceptance levels. Most variables are explained in Appendix 1. Additional variables included 
in  our  analysis  are  not  socio-economic  in  nature.  We  have  information  on  the  perceived 
effectiveness  of  the  measures,  and  have  an  estimate  of  the  value  of  time  (VOT)  of  the 
respondent. It is worthwhile to analyse the effects of these variables on acceptance
3.  
                                                            
3 We do not only have an estimate of the VOT of the respondent, also the value of schedule delay (early and late) 
and the value of uncertainty are available. We refer to appendix 3 for more information on the derivation of these 
values.  
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Appendix 1 shows the profile of our sample. Apparently Dutch commuters facing congestion 
are in most cases men and relatively high educated. A majority of the respondents is between 
26 and 45 years old and do not have children. These characteristics of our data base have been 
compared with the general profile of the Dutch car driver facing congestion, in order to check 
representativeness. Research by Goudappel Coffeng (1997) suggests that about 75% of all 
drivers in congestion is men (equal to our sample). Our sample includes more respondents 
between the age of 26 and 35 (about 10% more), whereas the share of persons older than 45 
years  is  lower  than  the  1997  profile.  Moreover,  drivers  in  congestion  tend  to  be  higher 
educated (our sample consists of 44.1% bachelors and masters whereas the general profile has 
36%) and have a higher income. The effect of the “over sampling” of lower income is clearly 
present.  About  25%  of  the  drivers  in  this  sample  has  an  income  below  €28.500  (modal 
income), whereas the 1997 profile predicts only 8% drivers to fall in this category. 
The respondent was confronted with three different types of road pricing measures. After a 
concise description of each measure, the respondents’ opinion on various issues was asked. 
People could indicate the acceptability of a specific measure on a 7-point scale, ranging from 
‘very unacceptable’ to ‘very acceptable’. We have also asked how effective they think that the 
measure would be, both individually (i.e. would you drive less?) and in general terms (will 
there be less congestion and will there be smaller environmental problems?). The answers to 
these  latter  questions  (also  on  a  7-point  scale)  have  been  included  into  the  analysis  as 
explanatory variables for the level of acceptance. 
 
Table 1: Short description of the transport pricing measures presented to the respondents 
Measure  Alternative 
1: Bottleneck passage  A: flat toll throughout the week 
B: coarse toll (flat within peak hours on working days) 
C: multistep toll during peak hours only 
D: toll depends on actual traffic conditions 
2:  Kilometer  charge  differentiated  by  vehicle 
type 
A: Revenues to general budget 
B: Revenues to traffic system 
C: Lower car taxation and new roads 
D: Revenues to public transport 
E: Abolishment of car ownership taxes 
F: Lower fuel taxes 
G: Revenues to improve and construct new roads 
3: Kilometer charge with different charge levels 
and different revenue use 
A: 2.5 €cent, unclear revenue use 
B: 5 €cent, unclear revenue use 
C: 7.5 €cent, unclear revenue use 
D: 2.5 €cent, improvement of road network 
E: 5 €cent, improvement of road network 
F: 7.5 €cent, improvement of road network 
G: 2.5 €cent, abolish existing car taxation 
H: 5 €cent, abolish existing car taxation 
I: 7.5 €cent, abolish existing car taxation 
 
Not each respondent had to evaluate the same type of measure. Within each type of measure, 
we  have  developed  various  alternatives  differing  on  type  of  charge  (measure  1),  type  of 
revenue use (measure 2) and level of charge plus revenue use (measure 3) (see Table 1). This 
resulted in 4 different alternatives for measure 1, 7 different alternatives for measure 2, and 9 
different descriptions of type 3 measure (a detailed description can be found in Appendix 2).  
All  alternatives  have  been  randomly  divided  over  the  respondents.  This  means  that  we 
obtained about 140 observations for each alternative of measure 1, 80 for each alternative of 
measure  2,  and  60  for  each  alternative  of  measure  3.  A  short  introduction  preceded  the 
explanation of the measures. This was to explain that one should imagine the implementation  
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of the measures in the Netherlands. It was also to be assumed that the privacy of car users is 
guaranteed,  electronic  equipment  registers  the  toll  and  the  driver  can  choose  freely  the 
payment method (e.g. credit card, bank transfer etc.).  
In addition, we have asked the respondents to evaluate the acceptance of different revenue 
uses  separately  (without  specifying  the  road  pricing  measure).  Six  different  revenue  use 
options were presented to the respondent: the treasury of the government (and hence be used 
for other purposes than transport), new roads, improvement of public transport (e.g. increase 
of frequencies), a removal of existing car ownership taxes, a decrease in fuel taxation and a 
decrease of income taxes. Again, for each option, a 7-point acceptability scale was used.     
 
3.3  Methodology and results 
Before investigating the distribution of the levels of acceptance we start with an overview of 
the average acceptance levels for each single measure. Figure 1 shows the mean acceptance 
outcomes and its confidence intervals
4.  
 
Figure 1: Mean and 95% confidence intervals of acceptance scores on each single measure 
(level 1 = very unacceptable; level 7 = very acceptable) 
 
The mean level of acceptance differs considerably between the various types of measures. 
Where  all  types  of  measure  1  (bottleneck  passage  tolls)  can  be  classified  as  somewhat 
unacceptable, this is not always the case for the other measures. In particular measures 2C 
(revenue use: new roads and less car taxation), 2E (abandoning of road taxation) and 2F 
(lower  fuel  taxes)  have  higher  acceptance  levels.  But,  a  score  of  4  still  means  that  the 
respondents are neutral. The patterns of outcomes for measure 3 can be easily explained by 
the  structure  of  the  measure  (a  combination  of  3  different charge  levels  with  3  different 
revenue use options). Apparently the respondents prefer revenues to be used for abolishment 
                                                            
4 We present ‘unweighted’ results. When we correct the outcomes for representativeness (on age, education and 
income) to obtain a good match with the profile of Goudappel Coffeng and create a ‘weighted’ sample, we find 
comparable results.   
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of car taxation over that of new road and an unclear destination. A charge of 2,5 €cent is more 
acceptable than higher charges of 5 and 7,5 €cent, as may be expected. Measure 3G has the 
highest mean (4,71) which comes close to an average score of 5 (‘somewhat acceptable’).  
These findings suggest the following interesting issues. First, given the results for measure 1 
it seems that the level of acceptability does not depend on the complexity of the measure. 
Hence,  acceptability  is  not  necessarily  a  reason  for  starting  simple.  Second,  measure  3 
suggests that revenue use has more effect on the level of acceptance than the charge level (for 
the chosen range). People prefer a charge of 7,5 €cent with abolishment of car taxation over a 
charge of 2,5 €cent with revenues hypothecated to the general treasury. This underlines the 
importance of the allocation of the revenues.    
Appendix  4A  shows  the  percentages  of  respondents  that  find  the  various  measures 
‘unaccaptable’  or  ‘very  unacceptable’.  These  outcomes  confirm  the  previous  described 
‘mean’ pattern. For instance, measure 3C is least acceptable, not only on average but also in 
terms of number of respondents.  
 
Methodology for assessing differences between groups 
Various econometric techniques are of course available that can be used to investigate the 
relation between various variables. The methodology to be applied depends to a large extent 
on the structure of the data. Here, the aim is first to explain the level of acceptance for the 
various measures, where the dependent variable consists of a choice out of an ordered set of 
acceptance alternatives. Given this framework, the ordered probit (OP) technique seems to be 
most appropriate (see for discussion of OP Maddala (1983)). Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), 
which assumes an unbounded continuous dependent variable, is less appropriate, although it 
would have had the advantage of more easily interpretable coefficients.  
The underlying response model for an OP estimation is of the following form (see Davidson 
and MacKinnon, 1993): 
. ' * e b + = i X ACC   
The  underlying  continuous  response  variable  ACC*  is  unobserved,  X  is  the  vector  of 
explanatory variables, β gives the vector of coefficients, and ε is the residual. The observed 
discrete response variable ACC is related to ACC* as follows: 
    1 = ACC   if  1 * m £ ACC ,   
    2 = ACC   if  2 1 * m m < £ ACC , 
3 = ACC   if  3 2 * m m < £ ACC , 
: 
    7 = ACC   if  * 6 ACC £ m . 
The   ’s  (threshold  values  in  the  model  output)  are  unknown  parameters  to  be  estimated 
jointly with β, and the model assumes that ε is normally distributed across observations. The 
constants   therefore divide the domain of ACC* into 7 segments, which corresponds with 
observations of the discrete response variable. The model estimates probability intervals for 
the seven possible answers: 
Prob ) ' ( ) ' ( ) ( 1 i j i j ij X X J Z b m b m - F - - F = = -  
where Φ is the cumulative standard normal, and Zij=J represents each acceptability score. The 
interpretation of the estimated coefficients is not straightforward. The estimated coefficients 
for  the  included  explanatory  variables  can  be  interpreted  as  indications  of  shifting  the 
distribution to the left or  the right depending on the sign of the  β’s. Assuming that  β is 
positive, this means that that the probability of the leftmost category (in this case ACC=1)  
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must  decline.  At  the  same  time  we  are  shifting  some  probability  into  the  rightmost  cell 
(ACC=7). But what happens to the middle cells is ambiguous and is dependent on the local 
densities. Hence, we must be very careful in interpreting the coefficients in this model (see 
Greene, 1993). The values of the coefficients can more easily be interpreted in a relative 
sense: a larger value denotes a larger marginal impact.  
Various specifications of the model for all measures (by including variables that may be 
expected to have some explanatory power) have been tried. The following tables present our 
preferred specifications. The estimations for each type of measure have been done with the 
same explanatory variables, to maximize comparability between the models.  
 
Measure 1: Electronic toll on daily bottlenecks with fixed revenue use (new roads) 
Table 2 presents the estimation results for measure 1. The first row presents the estimates for 
the thresholds values  ’s explained above. The second row presents all explanatory variables 
that  have  been  included  in  the  estimation.  It  appears  that  the  individual’s  value  of  time 
(VOT), level of education, and compensation of costs by the employer have a significant and 
positive impact on acceptance. Most signs of the coefficients are as expected, for example, 
respondents with higher value of time tend to have higher acceptance levels of an electronic 
toll on daily bottlenecks. Interestingly, inclusion of the individual’s value of schedule delay 
(early and late) and the value of uncertainty did not lead to significant results. This suggests 
that people find it hard to predict whether or not uncertainty will reduce under congestion 
pricing, and whether or not advantages  in terms of schedule delay costs  can  be realized. 
Alternatively, people may have ignored these matters. 
As expected, commuters that have to pay the toll themselves (no compensation) and drive 
many  kilometers  tend  to  find  the  measure  less  acceptable  than  drivers  receiving  full 
compensation and are using the car less often. Income is not significant; one explanation may 
be that VOT and education (both correlated with income) take up the expected effect. Income 
indeed becomes significant (at 5% level) when VOT and education are not included in the 
estimation. On the other hand, the type of measure, living in one of the three larger cities 
(loc1, included to compare the opinion of people located in densely urbanised areas with the 
rest of the Netherlands) and the weight of the car do not seem to have an important impact.  
As already visible in Figure 1, the different types of bottleneck charging measures have no 
significant effect on acceptance of the respondent. It makes no difference whether it is a 
charge at all times (1A), a peak time charge (1B), a differentiated peak charge (1C) or a 
charge  based  on  actual  traffic  conditions  (D),  although  the  latter  seems  somewhat  less 
acceptable than the other three (although not significantly). The perceived level of ‘general 
effectiveness’ in terms of (less) congestion (effectiveness (less congestion) in Table 2) has an 
important impact on acceptance
5. The results suggest that respondents who think that the 
measure will be effective also tend to find it more acceptable. The effectiveness in terms of 
less  environmental  problems  is  not  included  in  the  model  as  this  variable  was  highly 
correlated  with  ‘effectiveness  (less  congestion)’.  The  ‘personal  effectiveness’  (indicating 
whether  people  tend  to  use  their  car  less  when  the  measure  is  implemented)  shows  a 
somewhat  irregular pattern. Compared  to people  indicating not  to change  their  behaviour 
(peff=1),  respondents  that  find  a  personal  change  more  likely  have  a  higher  level  of 
acceptance. This may be explained by so-called protest voters in group 1: “the measure is not 
acceptable because I will not change behaviour” or “I say I will not change behaviour because 
I don’t want this measure implemented”. An explanation of the low score of peff=7 may be 
                                                            
5 The type of measure that has been proposed has no significant impact on the level of general effectiveness (in 
terms of less congestion).  
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that these respondents (indicating that they will most likely drive less) find the measure not 
that  acceptable  because  they  perceive  the  consequences  of  changing  behaviour  as  (very) 
negative.  
 
Table 2: Results of ordered probit analysis with the acceptance of measure 1 as dependent 
variable 
Variable  Probit ACC measure 1  Sign. 
Threshold ( ’s) 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 
1.073 (.450) 
2.309 (.456) 
2.781 (.458) 
3.136 (.461) 
4.036 (.469) 
5.564 (.538) 
 
** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
Gross yearly income 
VOT 
Gender  (female) 
Education 
  Edu2 (junior general sec.) 
  Edu3 (intermediate vocational) 
  Edu4 (senior general sec.) 
  Edu5 (bachelor) 
  Edu6 (master) 
Loc1 (3 large cities) 
Childyes 
Age 
  Age1 (18-25) 
  Age2 (26-35) 
  Age3 (36-45) 
  Age4 (46-55) 
Travel time in congestion/free flow tt 
Type of measure 
  M1A (charge of € 1)  
  M1B (charge of € 2during peak) 
  M1C (peak time charge) 
Yearly driven number of kilometers 
Comp1 (no transport costs paid by employer) 
Comp2 (transport costs partly compensated) 
Weight1 (low weight) 
Weight2 (middle weight) 
General effectiveness (less congestion) 
  Geff2 
  Geff3  
  Geff4 
  Geff5 
  Geff6 
  Geff7 
Personal effectiveness (drive less yourself)  
  Peff2 
  Peff3 
  Peff4 
  Peff5 
  Peff6 
  Peff7 
8.58 E-03 (.019) 
4.26 E-02 (.010) 
-.166 (.121) 
 
.245 (.232) 
.168 (.156) 
.414 (.198) 
.413 (.152) 
.739 (.191) 
-.197 (.121) 
9.92E-02 (.112) 
 
-.257 (.250) 
-9.48E-02 (.199) 
-4.91E-02 (.208) 
-.184 (.209) 
6.25E-02 (.075) 
 
.168 (.136) 
.167 (.128) 
.134 (.133) 
-2.92E-06 (.000) 
-.310 (.163) 
-9.93E-02 (.108) 
.167 (.189) 
.221 (.159) 
 
.774 (.149) 
1.107 (.185) 
1.554 (.236) 
1.765 (.185) 
2.145 (.262) 
1.859 (.497) 
 
354 (.128) 
.539 (.199) 
.212 (.196) 
.360 (.185) 
.447 (.230) 
2.92E-02 (.433) 
 
*** 
 
 
 
 
** 
*** 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
* 
 
 
 
 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
 
*** 
*** 
 
* 
* 
 
N   564   
Log-likelihood  -815.555  *** 
Pseudo R-square  Cox and Snell 
Nagelkerke 
McFadden 
.379 
.393 
.142 
Notes: The standard errors are shown in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, 
respectively, (two-sided t-test).  
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Measure 2: Kilometer charge dependent on vehicle weight with different revenue use  
Table 3 shows the estimation results for the second measure. Again we see the importance of 
the VOT and compensation of costs by the employer. Education is not as important as for 
measure 1. One explanation may be that measure 2 (like 3) is more easily accepted on the 
basis  of  equity  arguments,  which  require  less  intellectual  effort  than  effectiveness  or 
efficiency. A striking difference with the previous estimation is the difference between the 
(sub-) types of measure. Measure C, E and F obtain significantly more support than measure 
G, but also than the other 3 alternatives of this measure. This suggests that when revenues 
from the charge will be used to lower or abandon existing car taxation (2B and 2E) or fuel 
taxes (2F), more public support is obtained. The weight of the car (and also the yearly driven 
number of kilometers) does not have a significant impact, despite the fact that this measure 
differentiates  on  this  characteristic.  Again,  perceived  general  effectiveness  in  terms  of 
congestion and personal effectiveness have significant impact on the level of acceptance. We 
have included the effectiveness in terms of less congestion into the estimation and not the 
effectiveness on the environment despite its possible relevance here. These two variables are 
again strongly correlated and have equal results in terms of significance. The mean score on 
environmental  effectiveness  is  only  slightly  higher  than  the  perceived  effectiveness  on 
congestion (it is not  very  probable  that congestion will decrease or the environment will 
benefit from this measure). Given the nature of this measure, one may have expected a greater 
difference. Personal effectiveness shows almost an equal (irregular) pattern to what we have 
found for measure 1, again the same hypothesis applies here. 
 
Measure 3: Kilometer charge with different toll levels and revenue uses  
The third measure that we have analysed consists of 9 sub-measures that combine one out of 
three types of revenue use with one out of three levels of a charge. Two sets of dummy 
variables thus define the type of measure: one for the type of revenue use and one for the level 
of the charge. Table 4 shows the results for this estimation. It is interesting to see that the 
level of acceptance very much depends on the way revenues are redistributed, and (but less 
so, for the values considered) the level of the charge (as may be expected). Higher charges are 
relatively less acceptable, and abolishment of existing car taxes is far more acceptable than an 
unclear revenue use (note the high coefficient) and somewhat more than the construction of 
new roads. This is consistent with finding that measure 3G (combination of low charge and 
abandoning  of  existing  car  taxes)  is  relatively  most  acceptable  (confirmed  by  the  results 
shown in Figure 1). It is remarkable that the weight of the vehicle does have an explanatory 
impact here. This may have something to do with the fact that the previous measure was 
differentiated according to weight. In answering acceptance respondents may have compared 
it with that measure, therefore people with smaller cars find this measure less acceptable. 
Expected  effectiveness  has  again  a  very  significant  impact  on  the  level  of  acceptance. 
Commuters indicating that the measure will be effective are less opposed to this measure. The 
respondents’ value of time and education seem to loose importance compared with the other 
measures. In contrast to the previous measures, personal effectiveness is now not significant. 
It is not clear what causes these differences with the previous cases.  
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Table 3: Results of ordered probit analysis with the acceptance of measure 2 as dependent 
variable 
Variable  Probit ACC measure 2  Sign. 
Threshold ( ’s) 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 
-.263 (.443) 
.609 (.444) 
.943 (.445) 
1.267 (.445) 
1.898 (.448) 
3.073 (.461) 
 
 
 
** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
Gross yearly income 
Gender (female) 
Education 
  Edu2 (junior general sec.) 
  Edu3 (intermediate vocational) 
  Edu4 (senior general sec.) 
  Edu5 (bachelor) 
  Edu6 (master) 
Loc1 (3 large cities) 
Childyes 
Age 
  Age1 (18-25) 
  Age2 (26-35) 
  Age3 (36-45) 
  Age4 (46-55) 
Travel time in congestion/free flow tt 
Type of measure 
  M2A (revenues to general budget) 
  M2B (traffic system in general) 
  M2C (lower car taxes and new roads) 
  M2D (public transport) 
  M2E (abandon existing ownership tax) 
  M2F (lower existing fuel taxes) 
Yearly driven number of kilometers 
Comp1 (no transport costs paid by employer) 
Comp2 (transport costs partly compensated) 
Weight1 (low weight) 
Weight2 (middle weight) 
VOT 
General effectiveness (less congestion) 
  Geff2 
  Geff3  
  Geff4 
  Geff5 
  Geff6 
  Geff7 
Personal effectiveness (drive less yourself)  
  Peff2 
  Peff3 
  Peff4 
  Peff5 
  Peff6 
  Peff7 
-2.51E-02 (.019) 
-7.49E-02 (.119) 
 
-.115 (.223) 
8.12E-02 (.151) 
.213 (.193) 
.260 (.149) 
.424 (.184) 
-7.00E-02 (.119) 
1.23E-02 (.110) 
 
-8.21E-02 (.245) 
-.289 (.199) 
-.204 (.206) 
-.255 (.207) 
2.05E-02 (.073) 
 
-.139 (.173) 
-2.69E-02 (.178) 
.469 (.176) 
.138 (.172) 
.471 (.177) 
.524 (.176) 
-2.55E-06 (.000) 
-.372 (.160) 
-.246 (.106) 
.187 (.187) 
.131 (.156) 
2.37E-02 (.010) 
 
.637 (.139) 
.887 (.168) 
.846 (.193) 
1.216 (.184) 
1.258 (.275) 
2.287 (.790) 
 
.275 (.138) 
.400 (.180) 
.187 (.189) 
.420 (.187) 
.242 (.244) 
-.204 (.316) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
 
*** 
*** 
 
** 
** 
 
 
** 
 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
 
** 
** 
 
** 
 
 
N   564   
Log-likelihood  -935.406  *** 
Pseudo R-square  Cox and Snell 
Nagelkerke 
McFadden 
.272 
.280 
.087 
Notes: The standard errors are shown in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, 
respectively, (two-sided t-test). 
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Table 4: Results of ordered probit analysis with the acceptance of measure 3 as dependent 
variable 
Variable  Probit ACC measure 3  Sign. 
Threshold ( ’s) 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 
-2.43E-02 (.440) 
.960 (.441) 
1.331 (.442) 
1.728 (.444) 
2.325 (.447) 
3.405 (.459) 
 
 
** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
Gross yearly income 
Gender (female) 
Education 
  Edu2 (junior general sec.) 
  Edu3 (intermediate vocational) 
  Edu4 (senior general sec.) 
  Edu5 (bachelor) 
  Edu6 (master) 
Loc1 
Childyes 
Age 
  Age1 (18-25) 
  Age2 (26-35) 
  Age3 (36-45) 
  Age4 (46-55) 
Travel time in congestion/free flow tt 
Charge=5 €cent (dummy) 
Charge=7,5 €cent (dummy) 
Revenue use is new roads (dummy) 
Revenue use is abandon car taxes (dummy) 
Yearly driven number of kilometers 
Comp1 (no transport costs paid by employer) 
Comp2 (transport costs partly compensated) 
Weight1 (low weight) 
Weight2 (middle weight) 
VOT 
General effectiveness (less congestion) 
  Geff2 
  Geff3  
  Geff4 
  Geff5 
  Geff6 
  Geff7 
Personal effectiveness (drive less yourself)  
  Peff2 
  Peff3 
  Peff4 
  Peff5 
  Peff6 
  Peff7 
1.06E-02 (.019) 
-.3.05E-02 (.120) 
 
-.156 (.233) 
8.14E-02 (.154) 
8.38E-02 (.196) 
.280 (.151) 
.194 (.187) 
-5.31E-02 (.122) 
-7.00E-02 (.111) 
 
-.102 (.251) 
-.129 (.201) 
-9.25E-02 (.208) 
-.218 (.210) 
4.58E-03 (.074) 
-.273 (.114) 
-.536 (.115) 
.270 (.118) 
1.235 (.123) 
-2.15E-06 (.000) 
-.358 (.163) 
-.180 (.106) 
-.520 (.189) 
-.335 (.157) 
1.84E-02 (.010) 
 
1.050 (.159) 
1.230 (.185) 
1.090 (.218) 
1.605 (.205) 
1.779 (.284) 
.650 (.652) 
 
4.23E-02 (.149) 
-2.56E-02 (.202) 
.150 (.198) 
8.76E-02 (.204) 
9.21E-02 (.247) 
-.276 (.351) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
** 
*** 
** 
*** 
 
** 
* 
*** 
** 
* 
 
 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N   564   
Log-likelihood  -873.327  *** 
Pseudo R-square  Cox and Snell 
Nagelkerke 
McFadden 
.408 
.419 
.145 
Notes: The standard errors are shown in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, 
respectively, (two-sided t-test). 
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Revenue use only 
Finally,  we  have  asked  the  respondents  for  their  opinion  on  allocation  categories  of  the 
revenues per se, so without defining the road pricing measure. Six different possibilities have 
been evaluated on acceptance by the respondents (general budget, new roads, improve public 
transport,  abandon  existing  car  taxation,  lower  fuel  taxes  and  lower  income  taxes).  The 
findings presented in Figure 2 are largely in line with the previous findings of revenue use as 
part of a road pricing measure. An abolishment of existing car taxes is most preferred (a mean 
score  of  5.85,  a  6  is  ‘acceptable’),  whereas  the  general  budget  is  ‘unacceptable’.  The 
construction of new roads is valued rather positive here, while the acceptability of measure 
2G (kilometer charge with the same type of revenue use) is considerably lower (see Figure 1). 
More than 74% of the respondents indicated that the general budget is ‘unacceptable’ or ‘very 
unacceptable’ (see Appendix 4A). The confidence intervals are smaller than those of the road 
pricing measures (see Figure 1), indicating less variance in the answers.  
 
Figure 2: Mean and 95% confidence intervals of acceptance scores on each type of revenue use (level 
1 = very unacceptable; level 7 = very acceptable) 
 
We have carried out a similar type of (ordered probit) analysis as we did for the road pricing 
measures,  to  explain  the  acceptance  levels  for  these  types  of  revenue  use.  When  policy 
makers want to compensate certain groups, it is useful for them to know the preferences of 
these groups. The estimations of the preferred results can be found in Appendix 5. Again, for 
each type of revenue use the same explanatory variables have been included after having tried 
various specifications of the model (by including variables that may be expected to have some 
explanatory power).  
The results differ greatly over the various types of revenue use. Income is only significant 
when revenues are used to lower income taxes or to construct new roads. Lower income 
groups dislike revenues to be used for new roads more than people with a higher income, 
whereas the opposite holds when revenues are used to lower income taxes. The explanation 
for the first finding could be that lower income people drive less. For the second finding, the 
higher  marginal  utility  could  be  an  explanation.  Hence,  when  policy  makers  propose  to 
compensate the lowest income groups by lowering income taxes they obtain most support 
1
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6
7
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from  this  category  (although  overall  support  levels  for  this  type  are  rather  modest,  see 
Appendix 4B where we present the mean scores for the different income categories). Another 
interesting  variable  is  the  compensation  of  costs  by  the  employer.  As  may  be  expected, 
respondents who are not or only partly compensated have in general more support for an 
abandoning of existing car taxation than people who do not have to pay these taxes. This may 
also explain the disapproval of revenues being used for the general budget by people without 
a full compensation, a personal compensation is a better objective for this group. The weight 
of the vehicle seems important for two targets: lower fuel taxes and improvement of public 
transport.  Owners  of  smaller  vehicles  (with  lower  weights)  find  lower  fuel  taxes  less 
acceptable than others, this may be explained by the fact that this group drives relatively more 
fuel efficient and consequently benefits less than people with large (and heavy) cars. The 
importance of the VOT for certain allocation categories (i.e. general budget and improvement 
of public transport) seems somewhat strange and inexplicable.    
      
Summary and comparison 
Literature indicates that people have several concerns about road pricing, which explain the 
rather low levels of acceptance. Our findings confirm the low acceptability, the mean outcome 
for  most  measures  that  have  been  evaluated  is  ‘not  very  acceptable’.  However,  average 
acceptability of quite a few measures considered is only one point (out of 7) below neutral, 
which is less dramatic than an outright disapproval. Moreover, considerable differences exist 
between various measures.  
A first interesting finding from the analysis of measure 1 is that the type of measure may not 
always have a large impact on the level of acceptance. It does not matter whether a flat 
bottleneck toll is introduced or a time dependent charge (that is likely to be more difficult to 
understand). 
The  analysis  of  the  other  two  measures  indicates  that  (as  expected)  revenue  use  is  an 
important explanatory variable for the acceptance level. This confirms the findings of other 
studies  such  as  Verhoef  (1996).  It  is  also  found  that  individual  features  are  important. 
Education, the VOT of the respondents, and financial compensation (partly or full) by the 
employer are important explanatory variables. In accordance with Rienstra and others (1999), 
education has an increasing effect on support levels (only found for measure 1), whereas 
income seems to have no significant impact after correcting for education and value of time 
(all measures). We have also included the value of schedule delay (early and late) and the 
value of uncertainty of respondents into the analysis. Our study does not confirm that these 
individual indicators are important in explaining acceptance. The perceived effectiveness of 
the  measure  does  indeed  have  an  important  (positive)  impact  on  the  support  levels,  as 
indicated also by Steg (2003). In addition, we found a weaker relationship between personal 
effectiveness and support levels. We have looked at the effectiveness in environmental terms, 
but it appeared that answers were almost equal to effectiveness in terms of less congestion 
(and hence were too strongly correlated to allow use of both).   
The findings on acceptance for revenue use targets are similar to earlier reported results in 
literature. The allocation objectives that are in the direct interest of the road users receive 
most support. Improvement of public transport is less acceptable in comparison with findings 
of Schade and Schlag (2000). Revenues may theoretically ideally be used to reduce distortive 
income taxes (which is beneficial from a welfare perspective), but support for this option 
from Dutch commuters is low.  
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4.  Concluding Remarks      
Economists have advocated the use of  more appropriate  pricing tools for a long time  by 
demonstrating the welfare gains. Nevertheless, road pricing measures have up till now only 
seldom been implemented in practice. The low level of implementation is nowadays not so 
much  caused  by  technical  or  administrative  problems.  It  is  generally  acknowledged  that 
pricing measures meet public resistance and that acceptability is currently one of the major 
barriers to successful implementation of new and more efficient pricing measures.  
Despite the fact that politicians and the public regard transport problems as very urgent and 
important, people do have concerns about road pricing, resulting in low acceptance levels. 
Previous  studies  suggest  that  this  is  mainly  related  to  the  perceived  (low  level  of) 
effectiveness of the measure, the feeling that roads are free to use and the fact that it is an 
unfair  measure.  An  intelligent  communication  strategy  can  help  to  reach  some  level  of 
acceptance, but literature also suggests that there is an important role for the destination of 
revenues of the pricing measure. Spending targets that are in the direct interest of the road 
users seem to receive most support.  
The outcomes from a survey among Dutch commuters analysed in this paper confirm these 
findings.  The  first  measure  that  has  been  evaluated  by  the  respondents  (electronic  toll 
differing according to place and/or time without changing revenue use) is in general (for all 
alternatives) perceived as somewhat unacceptable, irrespective of the type (or alternative) of 
measure. The acceptance of second measure (a kilometer charge depending on vehicle weight 
combined with different allocation of revenues) does depend on the type of measure. This 
indicates that the respondents’ opinions on road pricing are very sensitive to the way tax 
revenues are allocated. The measure is more acceptable when revenues are used for a decrease 
in fuel taxes, an abolishment of existing car taxation or to lower existing car ownership taxes 
together with the construction of new roads; indeed those targets that are in the direct interest 
of the respondent (car driver). These findings correspond with results from the third measure. 
It is also found that higher charges are less acceptable.  
Most of our findings are in line with results of previous literature. For the first two measures 
(and to a lesser extent also for  measure  3) it was found that education, the VOT of the 
respondents  and  financial  compensation  (partly  or  full)  by  the  employer  are  important 
explanatory variables. Higher educated people, as well as respondents with a higher VOT, 
seem to find road pricing measures more acceptable than others. The same holds for people 
that receive financial support for their commuting costs. The perceived effectiveness of the 
measure (in terms of less congestion) does have an important (positive) impact on the support 
levels. Finally, we found a weaker relationship, an inverted U, between personal effectiveness 
and support levels.  
The analysis of measure 1 showed that the complexity of a measure does not affect the levels 
of acceptance. The structure of this measure was varied (with different toll structures when 
passing a bottleneck), while revenue allocation was kept constant. This  may  suggest that 
policy makers can consider more efficient differentiated pricing schemes instead of a rather 
simple flat fee in dealing with bottleneck congestion, without loosing acceptance. We have 
also included the value of schedule delay (early and late) and the value of uncertainty of 
respondents  into  the  analysis  of  these  measures.  The  results  do  not  confirm  that  these 
individual indicators are important in explaining acceptance. Despite the hypothesized impact 
of variables such as income, the driven number of kilometers and weight of the car (with 
measure  2),  we  haven’t  found  evidence  on  this.  The  effect  of  income  seems  to  be  fully 
captured by education and the value of time.   
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The above findings on revenue use targets are largely confirmed when we do not present the 
type  of  measure,  and  ask  directly  for  the  acceptance  of  various  ways  to  redistribute  the 
revenues. Dutch car commuters find it almost acceptable when policy makers decide to use 
the revenues to compensate the car drivers by abandoning current car taxation. This option 
outperforms all other destinations in terms of acceptance. Lower fuel taxes and new roads are 
slightly less acceptable. By far the least attractive option is the public treasury. The analysis 
towards explaining variables of these revenue use targets showed a very diverse pattern. For 
some  allocation  categories  (lower  income  taxes  and  new  roads)  income  was  important, 
whereas for other spending targets compensation of costs by the employer (e.g. abandoning 
existing car taxation) and the weight of the vehicle (e.g. lower fuel taxes) appeared to have 
impact on acceptance. Income seems the most relevant variable in this case because equity is 
often an issue when it comes to implementation of pricing measures and policy makers may 
want to compensate the lower income groups. It appears that lower income groups have a 
stronger preference to lower existing income taxes with revenues from road pricing compared 
with higher income people. The opposite holds when revenues are used to construct new 
roads. 
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Appendix 1: Explanation and population share of explanatory (dummy) variables of data 
set (N=564) 
Variable  Type 
 
Levels 
Gender  Dummy  Male (75,2%); Female (24,8%) 
Age  Dummies  Age1: 18-25 (7,3%), Age2: 26-35 (39,7%), Age3: 
36-45 (28,2%), Age4: 46-55 (18,1%), Age5: 56+ 
(6,7%)  
Education  Dummies  Edu1: primary (15,6%), Edu2: junior general 
secondary (MAVO) (6,0%), edu3: intermediate 
vocational (MBO) (24,8%), edu4: senior general 
secondary (HAVO/VWO) (9,4%), edu5: Bachelor 
(31,9%), edu6: Master (12,2%) 
Income (gross yearly)  Continuous   
Place of residence (region)  Dummies  Loc1: 3 large cities* (17,9%), loc2: rest west 
(33,9), loc3: north (3,7%), loc4: east (23,9), loc5: 
south (20,6%) 
Family size  Dummies  Fam1: 1 person (23%), fam2: 2 (31,6%), fam3: 3 
(18,3%), fam4: 4 (18,3%), fam5: 5 (7,6%), fam6: 
6 (1,2%)  
Number of children younger than 11  Dummies  Childno: 0 (72,5%), childyes: 1 or more (27,5%) 
Type of measure   Dummies  Measure 1A to 1D, 2A to 2G (see app. 2) 
Measure 3: charge level  Dummies  Charge=2.5 €cent, charge=5 €cent, charge=7.5 
€cent 
Measure 3: revenue use  Dummies  Revenue use is unclear, revenue use is new roads, 
revenue use is abandon car taxes 
VOT  Continuous   
Weight of the car  Dummies  Weight1: low weight (22,7%), weight2: middle 
class (67,2%), weight3: heavy (10,1%) 
Yearly number of kilometers driven  Continuous   
Compensation of costs by employer  Dummies  Comp1: none (11,9%), comp2: partly (43,8%), 
comp3: completely (44,3) 
Travel time with congestion/free flow 
travel time 
Continuous   
General effectiveness (will this 
measure lead to less congestion)  
Dummies  Geff1: very unlikely (20.4%), geff2: unlikely 
(37.4%), geff3: a little unlikely (14.4%), geff4: 
not likely, not unlikely (6.0%), geff5: a little 
likely (16.3%), geff6: likely (4.4%), geff7: very 
likely (1.1%)  
Personal effectiveness (will this 
measure make you drive less 
kilometers)  
Dummies  Peff1: very unlikely (31.7%), peff2: unlikely 
(34.9%), peff3: a little unlikely (8.2%), peff4: not 
likely, not unlikely (8.3%), peff5: a little likely 
(10.1%), peff6: likely (5.3%), peff7: very likely 
(1.4%)  
* Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague  
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Appendix 2: Description of measures 
 
Measure  Alternatives 
1.  Electronic toll on daily bottlenecks 
(independent of bad weather);  revenues 
hypothecated to construct new roads and 
improve existing roads 
A) charge of € 1,00 at all times 
B) charge of € 2,00 on working days, during peak 
hours: 7.00-9.00 and 17.00-19.00, no charge on 
other times 
C) peak time charge: 6:00- 7:00 € 0,50, 
7:00-7:30 € 1,00, 7:30-8:00 € 1,75, 8:00-8:30 € 
2,50, 8:30-9:00 € 1,75, 9:00-9:30 € 1,00, 9:30-
10:00 € 0,50. The same structure for the evening 
peak (16.00-20.00)  
D) charge depends on traffic density, more 
congestion means a higher charge with a 
maximum of € 5,00 
2.  Kilometer charge depending on weight of the 
car (heavy cars are less environmental 
friendly). Light cars pay 4 €cent per 
kilometer; middle weight cars pay 5 €cent 
per kilometer; heavy cars pay 6 €cent per 
kilometer. Monthly (extra) costs for the 
various types of cars based on average 
kilometrage were presented to respondent. 
A)  Revenues hypothecated to general budget of 
the government 
B)  Revenues hypothecated to the traffic system in 
general, this may include new roads or 
improvement of public transport 
C)  Revenues used to lower existing car taxes and 
improve or construct new roads 
D)  Revenues hypothecated to public transport 
E)  Revenues used to abolish existing car 
ownership taxes 
F)  Revenues used to lower existing fuel taxes 
G)  Revenues used to improve roads and construct 
new road infrastructure   
3.  Kilometer charge  A)  charge of 2,5 €cent per kilometer; revenue use 
unclear 
B)  charge of 5 €cent per kilometer; revenue use 
unclear 
C)  charge of 7,5 €cent per kilometer; revenue use 
unclear 
D)  charge of 2,5 €cent per kilometer; revenues 
used for new and better roads 
E)  charge of 5 €cent per kilometer; revenues used 
for new and better roads 
F)  charge of 7,5 €cent per kilometer; revenues 
used for new and better roads 
G)  charge of 2,5 €cent per kilometer; revenues 
used to abolish existing car taxes (ownership 
and purchase) 
H)  charge of 5 €cent per kilometer; revenues used 
to abolish existing car taxes (ownership and 
purchase) 
I)  charge of 7,5 €cent per kilometer; revenues 
used to abolish existing car taxes (ownership 
and purchase) 
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Appendix 3: Calculation of VOT, VSDL, VSDE and VUNC point estimates 
The value of time (VOT), value of schedule delay late (VSDL) and early (VSDE) and value 
of uncertainty (VUNC) were derived from questions posed in the stated choice experiment, 
aimed at establishing estimates at the individual level. Four different screens were designed fo 
this purpose (one for each variable), each offering four alternatives that differ in tolls, travel 
time, departure time and uncertainty (only in the screen for VUNC). The respondents were 
then asked to allocate ten (commuting) trips over these four different alternatives. The design 
of  the  alternatives  for  VOT,  VSDE,  VSDL  and  VUNC  respectively  has  been  created  as 
follows.  
The average VOT according to previous (Dutch) studies is about  € 7.5 per hour (see Gunn, 
2001 and AVV, 1998). Given this value, we have identified the following four intervals: 
1.  € 0 – 4  
2.  € 4 – 8 
3.  € 8 – 12 
4.  > € 12 
 
In order to allocate responses to one of the above categories, the following choice was offered 
(presented to the respondent in this format): 
 
  A 
(group 4) 
B 
(group 3) 
C 
(group 2) 
D 
(group 1) 
Departure time  TD  TD – 15 min.  TD – 30 min.  TD – 45 min. 
Travel time  Tf  Tf + 15 min.  Tf + 30 min.  Tf + 45 min. 
Arrival time  TA  TA  TA  TA 
Toll  € 6  € 3  € 1  € 0 
 
The  respondent  was  then  asked  to  allocate  ten  trips  over  these  four  alternatives.  If  the 
respondent chooses alternative C over D, we can infer that he is willing to pay € 1 to save 15 
minutes of travel time (implying a VOT of at least € 4 per hour). In order to calculate a point 
estimate for an individual we do need a mean interval value. It is not plausible to assume that 
the exact values are the middle points of its interval (and this is not possible for the fourth 
interval). Therefore we hypothesize that there is an underlying statistical distribution that can 
be  fitted  to  the  actual  aggregated  trip  allocation  of  the  point  estimate  questions  and 
approximate the mean interval values based on this presumed distribution. We have chosen to 
use  the  Gamma  distribution.  In  order  to  find  the  parameters  of  the  best  fitting  Gamma 
distribution, we have applied the least square method (minimum difference between actual 
and  simulated  distribution).  When  the  parameters  have  been  estimated,  it  is  possible  to 
determine  the  mean  interval  values.  Furthermore,  it  appeared  that  the  distributions  were 
(slightly)  different  for  income;  the  mean  interval  value  depends  on  the  income  of  the 
respondent. The table below presents the mean average values for VOT, VSDE, VSDL and 
VUNC for the different income groups.  
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VOT  VSDE  VSDL  VUNC  Income 
(gross 
yearly) 
0-4  4-8  8-12  >12  0-2  2-4  4-6  >6  0-8  8-16  16-24  >24  0-3  3-6  6-9  >9 
<28.500 €  2.4  5.9  9.8  18.5  1.1  2.9  4.9  9.6  3.5  11.7  19.7  44.1  1.6  4.4  7.3  13.4 
28.500-
45.000 € 
2.4  5.9  9.8  18.1  1.1  2.9  4.9  9.5  3.4  11.6  19.6  40.2  1.6  4.4  7.3  13.1 
45.000-
68.000 € 
2.7  6.0  9.9  17.6  1.1  2.9  4.9  9.5  3.5  11.6  19.7  40.2  1.6  4.4  7.3  13.3 
>68.000 €  2.7  6.0  9.9  17.9  1.1  2.9  4.9  9.5  3.2  11.6  19.6  38.9  1.6  4.4  7.3  12.9 
 
It is now possible to calculate a point estimate for an individual’s value of time as the 
weighted average of the intervals’ expected values, where the weights are determined by the 
trips allocated to that interval by the respondent. For instance, when a respondent with an 
income of less than 28.500€ allocates 5 trips to B and 5 trips to C a VOT point estimate of 7.8 
results ((5*5.9+5*9.8)/10). 
 
Below we show the alternatives that have been presented to the respondents in order to derive 
VSDE, VSDL and VUNC. 
Literature suggests that the VSDE is about half of the VOT. Therefore, we defined the 
following 4 intervals: 
1.  € 0 – 2 
2.  € 2 – 4 
3.  € 4 – 6 
4.  > € 6 
 
  A 
(group 4) 
B 
(group 3) 
C 
(group 2) 
D 
(group 1) 
Departure time  TD  TD – 15 min.  TD – 30 min.  TD – 45 min. 
Travel time  Tf  Tf  Tf  Tf 
Arrival time  TA  TA – 15 min.  TA – 30 min.  TA – 45 min. 
Toll  € 3  € 1.50  € 0.50  € 0 
 
According to the literature VSDL is about twice the VOT. Therefore, we defined the 
following 4 intervals: 
1.  € 0 – 8 
2.  € 8 – 16 
3.  € 16 – 24 
4.  > € 24 
 
  A 
(group 4) 
B 
(group 3) 
C 
(group 2) 
D 
(group 1) 
Departure time  TD  TD + 10 min.  TD + 20 min.  TD + 30 min. 
Travel time  Tf  Tf  Tf  Tf 
Arrival time  TA  TA + 10 min.  TA + 20 min.  TA + 30 min. 
Toll  € 8  € 4  € 1.33  € 0 
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We have defined, rather arbitrarily, the following intervals for the VUNC: 
1.  € 0 – 3 
2.  € 3 – 6 
3.  € 6 – 9 
4.  > € 9 
 
  A 
(group 4) 
B 
(group 3) 
C 
(group 2) 
D 
(group 1) 
Departure time  TD – 30 min.  TD – 30 min.  TD – 30 min.  TD – 30 min. 
Min. travel time  Tf + 30 min.  Tf + 5 min.  Tf   + 0 min.  Tf 
Max. travel time  Tf + 30 min.  Tf + 35 min.  Tf + 40 min.  Tf + 55 min. 
Min. arrival time  TA  TA – 15 min.  TA – 30 min.  TA – 45 min. 
Max. arrival time  TA  TA + 5 min.  TA + 10 min.  TA + 15 min. 
Tol  € 6  € 3  € 1  € 0 
 
 
The resulting average values for the VOT, the VSDE, the VSDL, and the VUNC for the 
different income groups are shown in the following Table. 
 
  VOT  VSDE  VSDL  VUNC 
<28.500 €  9.9  4.6  18.6  5.8 
28.500-45.000 €  9.2  4.3  14.9  5.0 
45.000-68.000 €  9.8  4.7  13.6  5.3 
>68.000 €  10.5  5.0  12.6  5.2 
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Appendix  4A:  Percentage  of  respondents  ranking  measures  and  revenue  use  as 
‘unacceptable’ or ‘very unacceptable’  
 
Type of Measure  % of respondents  Type of revenue use  % of 
respondents 
Measure 1A 
Measure 1B 
Measure 1C 
Measure 1D 
53,6 
51,5 
52,9 
55,9 
Measure 2A 
Measure 2B 
Measure 2C 
Measure 2D 
Measure 2E 
Measure 2F 
Measure 2G 
52,3 
50,0 
28,6 
48,3 
35,5 
37,2 
53,9 
Measure 3A 
Measure 3B 
Measure 3C 
Measure 3D 
Measure 3E 
Measure 3F 
Measure 3G 
Measure 3H 
Measure 3I 
59,3 
75,0 
81,5 
55,2 
48,6 
60,6 
13,6 
18,0 
32,3 
General budget 
New roads 
Improve public transport 
Abandon existing car taxation 
Lower fuel taxes 
Lower income taxes 
74,3 
8,6 
31,0 
3,2 
5,3 
33,5 
 
 
Appendix 4B: Mean of acceptance scores on each type of revenue use for four different 
income categories (level 1 = very unacceptable; level 7 = very acceptable) 
 
Allocation type  <28.500 € 
(N=140) 
28.500-45.000 € 
(N=179) 
45.000-68.000 € 
(N=152) 
>68.000 € 
(N=93) 
General budget  2.27  2.11  2.11  2.09 
New roads  4.97  5.11  5.26  5.62 
Improve public transport  4.08  3.88  4.11  3.86 
Abandon existing car taxation  5.84  5.77  5.97  5.79 
Lower fuel taxes  5.66  5.57  5.67  5.36 
Lower income taxes  4.22  3.85  3.75  3.50 
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Appendix 5: Ordered probit analysis with revenue use only as a dependent variable 
 
Variable  Revenue use: general budget  Revenue use: new roads  Revenue use: improve public 
transport 
Threshold ( ’s) 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 
-3.51E-02 (.288) 
.728 (.289) 
.987 (.290) 
1.259 (.292) 
1.783 (.299) 
2.674 (.351) 
Significance 
 
** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
 
-2.712 (.297) 
-2.186 (.283) 
-1.784 (.278) 
-1.345 (.275) 
-.691 (.272) 
.492 (.272) 
Significance 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
** 
* 
 
-.510 (.268) 
.167 (.267) 
.406 (.267) 
.734 (.268) 
1.332 (.270) 
2.030 (.276) 
Significance 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
** 
* 
Income (gross yearly) 
  Income 1 (less than €28.500) 
  Income 2 (€28.500-€45.000) 
  Income 3 (€45.000-€68.000) 
Gender (female) 
Loc1 
Age 
  Age1 (18-25) 
  Age2 (26-35) 
  Age3 (36-45) 
  Age4 (46-55) 
Yearly driven number of kilometers 
Comp1 (no transport costs paid by employer) 
Comp2 (transport costs partly compensated) 
Weight1 (low weight) 
Weight2 (middle weight) 
VOT 
 
6.74E-02 (.151) 
4.31E-04 (.143) 
-2.07E-02 (.147) 
7.94E-02 (.151) 
-.136 (.125) 
 
4.65E-02 (.249) 
-7.72E-02 (.195) 
-.151 (.200) 
-4.49E-02 (.210) 
-2.67E-02 (.000) 
-.447 (.166) 
-.203 (.108) 
.155 (.195) 
.168 (.163) 
2.20E-02 (.010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
* 
 
 
** 
 
-.451 (.145) 
-.360 (.137) 
-.265 (.140) 
-.137 (.115) 
7.236E-03 (.116) 
 
-.490 (.240) 
-.275 (.195) 
-.324 (.192) 
-.407 (.202) 
-1.129E-06 (.000) 
-.128 (.152) 
-.179 (.102) 
-1.984E-02 (.249) 
9.005E-02 (.151) 
9.026E-02 (.009) 
 
*** 
*** 
* 
 
 
 
** 
 
* 
** 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
8.66E-02 (.142) 
1.163E-02 (.134) 
.129 (.137) 
3.342E-02 (.113) 
6.312E-02 (.115) 
 
-.257 (.236) 
-7.023E-02 (.184) 
-.149 (.188) 
-.236 (.197) 
1.930E-06 (.000) 
-.104 (.151) 
-.152 (.100) 
.544 (.180) 
.354 (.180) 
2.24E-02 (.009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
** 
** 
N   564    564    564   
Log-likelihood  -795.618  **  -899.676  **  -1054.943  ** 
Pseudo R-square  Cox and Snell 
Nagelkerke 
McFadden 
.035 
.037 
.012 
Cox and Snell 
Nagelkerke 
McFadden 
.051 
.053 
.016 
Cox and Snell 
Nagelkerke 
McFadden 
.044 
.045 
.012 
 
Variable  Revenue use: abandon existing     
car taxation 
Revenue use: lower fuel taxes  Revenue use: lower income taxes  
Threshold ( ’s) 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 
-2.324 (.317) 
-1.854 (.295) 
-1.660 (.290) 
-1.154 (.284) 
-.586 (.281) 
.504 (.281) 
Significance 
 
** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
 
-2.233 (.299) 
-1.771 (.286) 
-1.487 (.282) 
-1.107 (.279) 
-.598 (.277) 
.622 (.277) 
Significance 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
** 
** 
 
-.715 (.270) 
.169 (.267) 
.468 (.268) 
.797 (.268) 
1.304 (.270) 
2.121 (.278) 
Significance 
*** 
 
* 
*** 
*** 
*** 
Income (gross yearly) 
  Income 1 (less than €28.500) 
  Income 2 (€28.500-€45.000) 
  Income 3 (€45.000-€68.000) 
Gender (female) 
Loc1 
Age 
  Age1 (18-25) 
  Age2 (26-35) 
  Age3 (36-45) 
  Age4 (46-55) 
Yearly driven number of kilometers 
Comp1 (no transport costs paid by employer) 
Comp2 (transport costs partly compensated) 
Weight1 (low weight) 
Weight2 (middle weight) 
VOT 
 
1.21E-02 (.148) 
-3.73E-02 (.139) 
.180 (.144) 
-2.86E-02 (.118) 
-7.317E-02 (.120) 
 
-.430 (.246) 
-.221 (.194) 
-7.54E-02 (.199) 
-6.23E-02 (.209) 
1.17E-06 (.000) 
.411 (.159) 
.249 (.105) 
-.199 (.187) 
-3.52E-02 (.156) 
4.85E-03 (.010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
*** 
** 
 
 
 
 
.174 (.146) 
.171 (.137) 
.297 (.141) 
3.323E-02 (.117) 
-.242 (.118) 
 
-5.82E-02 (.244) 
-4.95E-02 (.191) 
-.129 (.195) 
2.18E-02 (.205) 
-1.43E-06 (.000) 
.436 (.158) 
.120 (.103) 
-.506 (.187) 
-.284 (.156) 
4.87E-03 (.010) 
 
 
 
** 
 
** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
 
*** 
* 
 
 
.421 (.142) 
.225 (.134) 
.241 (.137) 
6.70E-02 (.113) 
-.287 (.115) 
 
.456 (.236) 
.449 (.185) 
.374 (.189) 
7.03E-02 (.198) 
-2.660E-06 (.000) 
9.84E-02 (.150) 
-6.45E-02 (.100) 
2.80E-03 (.179) 
7.56E-02 (.179) 
1.24E-02 (.009) 
 
*** 
* 
* 
 
** 
 
 
* 
** 
** 
* 
 
 
 
 
N   564    564    564   
Log-likelihood  -777.800  *  -830.182  **  -1041.136  *** 
Pseudo R-square  Cox and Snell 
Nagelkerke 
McFadden 
.040 
.043 
.015 
Cox and Snell 
Nagelkerke 
McFadden 
.045 
.048 
.015 
Cox and Snell 
Nagelkerke 
McFadden 
.062 
.063 
.017 
Notes: The standard errors are shown in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, 
respectively, (two-sided t-test). 
  